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Beyond Kyoto: North-South Implications of 




As scientific evidence of the human causes and consequences of global 
climate change mounts, there is renewed urgency to reduce global 
emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases responsible for 
climate change.2  One of the most significant political-environmental 
debates surrounding climate change involves the participation of developing 
countries in international climate control efforts.  At the heart of this 
controversy lies the preferential treatment afforded to developing countries 
by the Kyoto Protocol, the prevailing international treaty on climate change.  
Critics allege that the Kyoto Protocol prioritized equity for developing 
countries at the expense of efficiency in international climate control, and as 
a result, failed to elicit the level of international cooperation necessary to 
prevent potentially catastrophic climate change.3  Implicit in this critique is 
an assumption, common within the mainstream of the economics 
profession, that equity and efficiency are separable issues.4  In this paper, I 
argue that this assumption has falsely framed the debate over the 
participation of developing countries in international climate control as an 
either/or phenomenon: either the Kyoto Protocol sacrifices efficiency in the 
pursuit of equity by exempting developing countries from mandatory 
emissions limits, or it improves efficiency by eliminating special 
exemptions for these countries.  
I argue that a critical rethinking of the relationship between equity and 
efficiency in global climate control is long overdue.  As the international 
community embarks on the next round of climate negotiations and debates 
the role of developing countries in global climate control efforts, clarifying 
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the tradeoffs between equity and efficiency takes on renewed importance.  I 
argue that it is possible to improve efficiency in global climate control 
without sacrificing equity for developing countries.  A climate control treaty 
that is efficient will shift more emissions abatement to the South, where 
many countries have lower cost options for reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions than in the North.  A climate control treaty that is equitable will 
shift more of the costs of emissions reduction to the North, where the 
countries most responsible for climate change and most able to pay to 
prevent climate change are located.  Therefore, to improve equity and 
efficiency in international climate control, mechanisms for locating 
emissions reduction in the South while distributing the resulting costs to the 
North need to be further explored.  Ironically, emissions taxes and trading, 
what the mainstream of the economics profession hails as “market friendly” 
mechanisms, can be used to shift abatement to the South while 
redistributing the cost to the North.  Typically, economists emphasize the 
cost-savings associated with these mechanisms, preferring to treat the 
efficiency of these mechanisms separately from equity.5  I argue that 
emissions taxes and trading should be more fully incorporated in global 
climate control efforts if policy makers maintain their commitment to 
fairness for developing countries in climate control and use these 
mechanisms deliberately to reduce North-South inequalities.  
In Section I of this paper, I explain the special relationship between 
equity and efficiency in the case of climate control and other global public 
goods and highlight the challenges for policy makers.  In Section II, I 
describe the history of international climate control efforts thus far, with 
particular attention to how a commitment to fairness for developing 
countries may have limited the potential efficiency of these efforts.  In 
Section III, I introduce emissions taxes and trading as potential mechanisms 
for improving the efficiency of international climate control efforts and 
demonstrate how these mechanisms can be used deliberately to reduce 
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North-South inequalities.  In Section IV, I conclude with my prediction of 
the direction global climate control negotiations will likely take.    
I.   EQUITY, EFFICIENCY, AND CLIMATE CHANGE    
Understanding the relationship between equity and efficiency in climate 
control and its implications for policy makers is complicated by the fact that 
climate control is a global public good.6  Because greenhouse gases are 
transboundary pollutants that yield the same impact on global climate 
regardless of where they are produced, reducing greenhouse gases in any 
one country, to the extent that it mitigates the threat of global climate 
change, generates a public good benefit for all countries.  Economists have 
long demonstrated the fundamental problem with public goods: there is 
insufficient incentive for any one individual to provide them.7  In the case of 
climate change, individual countries are reluctant to incur the costs of 
emissions abatement if other countries benefit at their expense.  Rather, the 
rational strategy for any one country is to “free-ride” on the emissions 
abatement of others.  A country will only voluntarily reduce its emissions if 
its own private benefit from emissions reduction outweighs its own cost.  
However, this level of abatement is less than optimal from a global 
perspective.  Because every unit of emissions reduction benefits all 
countries, the global benefit from any one country’s emissions reduction 
likely exceeds its cost.  A country that voluntarily reduces emissions incurs 
the entire cost of its abatement but captures only a fraction of the total 
global benefit it creates.  Because the demand for global emissions 
reduction is greater than any one individual country’s demand for emissions 
reduction, each country abates less than what is globally optimal.  
The implication of the public good problem for international climate 
control is clear: international cooperation is necessary to achieve the 
optimal level of global emissions abatement.  Absent cooperation, countries 
will choose abatement levels on the basis of their own private costs and 
benefits, ignoring the greater global benefit their abatement provides.  An 
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international climate control agreement can overcome the “free-rider” 
problem and achieve the optimal level of global emissions abatement.  
For economists, the optimal, or efficient, level of global emissions 
abatement is the level that maximizes the net global benefit from emissions 
abatement.8  Economists would describe an international climate control 
treaty as “efficient” if it satisfies two conditions.  First, it must guarantee 
that individual countries reduce emissions sufficiently such that the optimal 
global level of emissions abatement is achieved.9  Second, the treaty must 
minimize the cost to individual countries of reducing their emissions to 
ensure that the optimal level of global abatement is achieved at the lowest 
possible global cost.  The total global cost of abatement is minimized when 
the cost of the last unit of emissions reduction in any one country, the 
marginal cost, is the same for all countries.10  For example, if the last unit of 
emissions abatement in country X exceeded the cost of the last unit of 
abatement in country Y, shifting abatement from X (the country with the 
higher marginal abatement cost) to Y (the country with the lower marginal 
abatement cost) would lower the total global cost of emissions abatement. 
For this reason, an efficient climate control treaty will equalize marginal 
abatement costs among all countries.  An inefficient treaty will either 
produce too little global abatement and/or fail to produce that level of 
global abatement at the lowest possible total global cost.   
Three problems arise for policy makers charged with designing an 
efficient climate control treaty.11  First, not all countries may benefit equally 
from climate control.  Second, equalizing marginal abatement costs among 
countries may mean that some countries—countries that can abate 
emissions at comparatively lower cost—will abate much more than others.  
These two possibilities suggest that some countries will benefit more from 
participating in an efficient treaty, whereas other countries could potentially 
be worse off for their participation.12  Countries anticipating lower climate 
change related damages, and/or countries with relatively low abatement 
costs, will derive a lower (or negative) net benefit from an efficient treaty 
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than countries who benefit more from preventing climate change and whose 
relatively high abatement costs mean they have to abate less.13  Therefore, 
differences in countries’ abatement costs and benefits are significant, 
because for an international climate control agreement to be self-enforcing, 
all sovereign countries must find it in their self-interests to voluntarily 
participate.14  
The third problem policy makers confront in designing an efficient 
climate control treaty is that not all countries are equally responsible for the 
accumulation of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere that is driving climate 
change.15  Nor do all countries demonstrate equal ability to pay for the costs 
of reducing greenhouse gas emissions.16  For equity reasons, policy makers 
may want to shift the burden of emissions reduction more heavily to those 
countries that share greater responsibility for climate change and can better 
afford abatement.17  If satisfying these equity concerns requires shifting 
abatement from low-cost, high-benefiting countries to high-cost, low-
benefiting countries, the treaty will fail to elicit sufficient participation, and 
it will fail to minimize the total global cost of mitigating climate change.18  
The treaty will produce too little global abatement at too high a global cost. 
I argue that these problems that policy makers confront in designing an 
efficient and equitable climate control treaty are not intractable, though their 
existence predictably complicates negotiations.19  As compared to a non-
cooperative, non-treaty outcome where countries choose abatement levels 
independently of each other, an efficient climate control treaty can increase 
global abatement to optimal levels and reduce the global cost of achieving 
that abatement.  The change from a non-cooperative outcome to an efficient 
treaty can produce benefits in excess of costs, i.e., an efficiency gain.  
Generating this efficiency gain means that an efficient treaty can make all 
countries better off.  Whether or not an efficient treaty actually renders 
every country better off will depend on how that efficiency gain is 
distributed among countries. 
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To ensure that the efficiency gain from an efficient international climate 
control treaty is distributed fairly among countries, I argue that it is 
necessary to distinguish between where abatement takes place and who 
pays for it.  Mechanisms such as emissions trading and taxes can 
accomplish this.  These mechanisms can be used to lower the costs of 
global emissions abatement and to fairly distribute the costs and benefits of 
global abatement among countries.  I argue that using emissions trading and 
taxes as deliberate means of fairly distributing the costs and benefits of 
global climate control is a better approach than the current approach of 
exempting developing countries from emissions quotas.  Both mechanisms, 
deemed “market-friendly” alternatives to a “command-and-control” 
regulatory approach by mainstream economists, can be used to improve 
efficiency in international climate control without necessarily 
compromising fairness for developing countries.20 
II.   INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CONTROL EFFORTS  
Examining the history of international climate control sheds valuable 
light on the deficiencies of the prevailing approach to mitigating climate 
change and illuminates an alternative path for future policy makers to take. 
Attempts to forge international cooperation on mitigating climate change 
began in 1992 with the United Nation’s Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCC) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil.21  At that time, the participating 
industrialized countries agreed to voluntarily reduce their greenhouse gas 
emissions.22  However, the need to strengthen the UNFCC soon became 
evident as most of the industrialized countries failed to meet their voluntary 
targets and emissions in some countries actually increased.23  More than one 
hundred and fifty countries convened in Kyoto, Japan, in 1997 to negotiate 
binding emissions quotas.24  The product of those negotiations, the Kyoto 
Protocol, remains the prevailing international agreement on combating 
climate change to date. 
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The Kyoto Protocol establishes binding emissions limits for 
industrialized countries and a range of mechanisms to promote cost-
effective compliance.  Following the framework of the UNFCC, the Kyoto 
Protocol differentiates between two groups of countries worldwide:  
“Annex I” countries, which are subject to emissions limits, and “non-Annex 
I” countries, which have no binding commitments.  The list of non-Annex I 
countries consists of developing countries.  The list of Annex I countries is 
comprised of thirty-nine industrialized countries and countries with 
economies in transition.25  These countries account for two-thirds of global 
carbon emissions.26  The United States alone, accounting for less than 5 
percent of the world’s population, produces 25 percent of global carbon 
emissions.27  Although individual country commitments vary, Annex I 
countries, on average, are required to reduce emissions by 5.2 percent of 
their 1990 emissions levels during the commitment period from 2008-
2012.28  
Policy makers confronted three challenges in designing the Kyoto 
Protocol.  First, in keeping with the original UNFCC mandate, they were to 
establish emissions targets compatible with stabilizing greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere at levels that would prevent catastrophic 
human-induced climate change.29  Second, to improve efficiency and 
increase the willingness of countries to participate, policy makers needed to 
include mechanisms such as emissions trading to minimize the costs to 
countries of meeting their targets.30  Lastly, to address historical imbalance 
in greenhouse gas production and differences in countries’ abilities to pay 
for abatement, policy makers had to distribute the costs of preventing 
climate change equitably among countries.31 
It can be argued that the Kyoto Protocol represents a truly remarkable 
and unprecedented example of the willingness of the global community to 
prioritize fairness for developing countries in an international agreement.  
Equity concerns motivated a climate control framework that assigned 
countries differentiated responsibilities for reducing emissions in 
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recognition of their ability to pay and their historic contribution to the build-
up of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.32  But what price, if any, did the 
international community pay for this commitment to fairness? 
The most immediate implication of the Kyoto Protocol’s exemption of 
developing countries is that developing countries lack direct incentives to 
limit their emissions.  This is especially problematic given the predicted rate 
of emissions increase in these countries in the near future.33  As long as 
developing countries can ignore the negative external effects of their 
emissions production on global climate, emissions production in developing 
countries will exceed optimal levels.34  By imposing limits on developed 
countries, however insufficient those levels may prove to be in preventing 
climate change, the Kyoto Protocol imputed a cost to emissions in 
developed countries that is (theoretically) accounted for in decisions 
regarding emissions activity.  For every ton of emissions they produce, 
developed countries must either pay to offset those emissions in order to 
meet their Kyoto targets, or forgo the revenues they could have earned from 
selling emissions reduction credits to other countries.35  The Kyoto Protocol 
ensures that every ton of emissions produced in the developed world has an 
implicit price attached to it.  Whether that price is sufficiently high to 
capture the full global cost of emissions is an important point worth 
debating and one that speaks to the overall efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol.  
However, it is clear that as long as developing countries are exempt from 
emissions quotas the Kyoto Protocol cannot achieve the optimal level of 
global abatement. 
The second implication of exempting developing countries from 
mandatory emissions quotas is that the Kyoto Protocol concentrates 
abatement in the areas of the world where abatement may cost most.  
Marginal abatement costs typically increase with the level of emissions 
abatement.36  Countries exhaust least-cost options for reducing emissions 
first, such that subsequent abatements cost increasingly more.  Developed 
countries, because they have engaged in more emissions abatement on 
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average than developing countries, tend to exhibit higher marginal 
abatement costs.37 
In addition, some of the least-cost methods for reducing emissions stem 
from forest resources that are relatively more abundant in the developing 
world.  Forests sequester carbon emissions from the atmosphere and store 
the carbon long-term in vegetation and soils.  Land use change that 
contributes to deforestation reduces carbon sequestration and releases stored 
carbon back into the atmosphere.38  Restoring, expanding, or preserving 
forest areas are effective means for mitigating climate change.39  The 
relatively low opportunity costs of protecting and expanding tropical forests 
would make this an attractive abatement option for many developing 
countries if the Kyoto Protocol provided these countries with incentives to 
offset their emissions.40 
To minimize the total global cost of emissions abatement, the Kyoto 
Protocol would have needed to allocate abatement across countries to 
equalize countries’ marginal abatement costs.  If marginal abatement costs 
are lower in developing countries, efficiency should have required the 
Kyoto Protocol to shift more abatement activity to the developing world.  
The problem, of course, was that shifting abatement to developing countries 
violated the international community’s commitment to fairness in climate 
control.  The Kyoto Protocol concentrates abatement in the developed world 
instead, despite the fact that global abatement costs are likely higher as a 
result.  By exempting developing countries from mandatory emissions 
limits, the Kyoto Protocol increased the cost of global climate control and 
diminished the incentive of other countries to participate.  Simulations 
reveal that the highest net global benefits from climate control manifest 
under scenarios that include the full participation of both developing and 
developed countries, and where international emissions trading ensures that 
emissions activity is concentrated in the countries where it costs least.41 
The most significant problem with the Kyoto Protocol, however, is that it 
fails to generate sufficient abatement to prevent climate change.  The United 
706 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES OF FREE TRADE 
States dealt a potentially lethal blow to international climate control efforts 
with its decision in 2001 to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol after years of 
active negotiating to shape the treaty’s framework in its own best interests.42  
The United States cited the lack of participation of developing countries and 
the resulting high cost-to-benefit ratio of the Kyoto Protocol as its primary 
reason for withdrawal.43  To enter into force, the Kyoto Protocol required 
ratification by at least 55 countries representing at least 55 percent of 
emissions in the developed world.  Without the United States, which is the 
world’s largest emissions producer, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol 
required the participation of almost every other developed country.  When 
the Kyoto Protocol finally entered into force in February 2005, it included 
161 nations representing 62 percent of developed country emissions.  On 
average, these nations will reduce their emissions by 5.2 percent from their 
1990 levels.44 
According to most climate scientists, an effective solution to climate 
change will require more emissions reduction than the Kyoto Protocol 
requires during its initial 2008–2012 commitment period.45  If net emissions 
from human sources remain at current levels, atmospheric concentrations 
will soon climb to roughly twice their preindustrial levels.46  Stabilizing 
atmospheric concentrations at their current levels would require an 
immediate 50–70 percent reduction in global emissions and further 
reductions thereafter.47  Stabilizing atmospheric concentrations at current 
levels would only limit the increase in average global temperature to 
3.5 Celsius degrees or less by the year 2100.48  The Kyoto Protocol, though 
it is an important first step toward mitigating climate change, cannot 
prevent climate change. 
The international community has already begun the next stage of climate 
negotiations.  In December 2005, the parties to the Kyoto Protocol met in 
Montreal to plan for emissions reduction beyond Kyoto’s initial 2008–2012 
commitment period.49  During the next commitment period, more extensive 
reductions, upwards of 30–60 percent, will have to be achieved.50  The 
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participation of the United States is absolutely critical in this regard.  
However, inducing cooperation from the United States will likely prove to 
be the most difficult problem for international climate negotiators to solve.  
Negotiators will also have to grapple with developing countries, and 
whether exemptions for equity reasons should continue to be granted in this 
next round of climate action.  If the potential efficiency loss from 
exemptions undermines the effectiveness of global climate control efforts, 
the issue becomes one of whether equity for developing countries can be 
achieved through means other than exemptions. 
III.   BEYOND KYOTO:  EQUITY AND EFFICIENCY RECONSIDERED 
Mainstream economics has falsely framed the debate over the 
participation of developing countries in international climate control as an 
either/or phenomenon:  either a climate control treaty sacrifices efficiency 
to achieve fairness for developing countries by exempting developing 
countries from mandatory emissions limits, or it sacrifices equity to 
improve efficiency by eliminating such preferential treatment.  Efficiency in 
global climate control requires two things:  (1) that all countries internalize 
the external costs of their emissions such that the optimal level of global 
abatement is achieved, and (2) that the global cost of achieving optimal 
abatement is minimized by distributing abatement to the countries where it 
costs least.51  These efficiency conditions imply that not only should limits 
be placed on developing countries’ emissions, but that global abatement 
should be centered in the developing world because of its comparatively 
lower abatement costs.  The global community is right to reject such an 
outcome as grossly unfair if further mechanisms are not put in place to 
redistribute the costs of abatement from developing countries to developed 
countries.  The issue of where abatement takes place in the world is 
separable from the issue of who pays for it.  Where abatement takes place is 
largely an efficiency issue.  Who pays for abatement is an issue of  fairness.  
In the case of global climate control, equity and efficiency are not separable 
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issues.  An international climate control treatment can be both fair and 
efficient if the appropriate redistributive mechanisms are implemented. 
Emissions trading and emissions taxes can improve efficiency in 
international climate control without necessarily compromising fairness for 
developing countries.  An emissions tax charges emissions producers a fee 
equivalent to the marginal damage of their emissions for every unit of 
emissions they produce.52  Emissions trading requires emissions producers 
to obtain a permit in order to emit.  The total amount of emissions is capped 
by the number of permits issued and producers are allowed to buy and sell 
permits among themselves as they deem necessary.53  Mainstream 
economics treat emissions taxes and emissions trading as theoretical 
equivalents in terms of efficiency.54  Both mechanisms can achieve the 
socially desirable level of emissions reduction by forcing emissions 
producers to internalize the external costs of their emissions.55  Whether 
producers are required to pay a tax equal to the marginal damage of their 
emissions, or producers are required to obtain an emissions permit with a 
price equal to the marginal damage of their emissions, the penalty for 
emitting and the producer’s incentive to reduce emissions is the same.56 
Moreover, both mechanisms can lower the costs of reducing emissions in 
comparison to a standard regulatory approach.57  Regulations typically 
mandate that emissions producers adopt a specific technology to reduce 
emissions (e.g., scrubbers), or mandate that all producers reduce their 
emissions by a certain percentage.58  While this approach should produce 
the socially desired level of emissions reduction, it often inflates costs by 
failing to account for differences in abatement costs between different 
producers and technologies.  In comparison, emissions taxes and emissions 
trading introduce more flexibility to help insure that the least-cost methods 
for reducing emissions are adopted.59  Producers who can find ways to abate 
emissions at a relatively low cost will reduce emissions to avoid the more 
costly emissions tax or tradable permit price.  Producers who can reduce 
emissions at a relatively high cost will pay the tax or obtain a permit to 
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avoid more costly abatement activities.60  Mainstream economists typically 
prefer emissions taxes and emissions trading over regulation because they 
can produce the same level of abatement as regulation at a potentially lower 
cost.61 
While emissions taxes and trading may be equivalent in many respects, 
they differ significantly in their distributional consequences.  Emissions 
taxes adhere to the principle that the “polluter pays,” which means that 
those responsible for generating societal costs are required to pay for the 
damages.62  Not only is this deemed fair by most in society, but it is also 
efficient in that it provides the right incentives to producers to minimize the 
social costs of their production.  An emissions trading scheme could be 
designed in such a way that the polluter also pays, but this is neither 
required in theory nor common in practice.63  Whether or not the polluter 
pays under an emissions trading scheme depends on the initial allocation of 
the permits.64  When permits are sold to emissions producers, emissions 
producers pay for the right to emit and this payment theoretically 
compensates for the damages caused by their emissions.  When permits are 
sold to emissions producers, they force the polluter to pay and their 
distributive effects are equivalent to taxes.65 
Permits, however, can be awarded for free to emissions producers.66  In 
this case, polluters are granted the right to emit pollutants up to a certain 
level while the public essentially surrenders its right to fair compensation 
for harms generated by the emissions.  For mainstream economists trained 
to prioritize efficiency over equity, the distributional differences between 
permits and taxes are inconsequential, for even when permits are awarded 
for free, permits theoretically provide the same incentives to reduce 
emissions as taxes as long as the permits are tradable.67  An emissions 
producer who is awarded free permits can always sell those permits to 
another emissions producer.  By emitting, producers forego the lost revenue 
they could have earned from the sale of their permits to other producers.  
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This theoretically provides an incentive to lower emissions to even those 
producers who are awarded permits for free.68  
A.   Emissions Trading  
The structure and design of the Kyoto Protocol embodies many of the 
principles of an emissions trading scheme.  The Kyoto Protocol is 
essentially an emissions trading scheme whereby the rights to emit at the 
levels specified by individual country quotas were awarded freely.  Though 
proponents of the Kyoto Protocol are often hesitant to portray it in this way, 
what the Kyoto Protocol did was create and award property rights over the 
atmospheric commons.  The initial assignment of emissions rights under the 
Kyoto Protocol determined the distribution of the net benefits from the 
treaty’s implementation.  The right to produce a certain level of emissions 
without penalty is highly valued, especially if that right can be sold to other 
countries.  If emissions rights are transferable, countries can choose to meet 
their emissions target by reducing emissions or by purchasing those rights 
from other countries.  As long as marginal abatement costs are different 
between countries, countries with lower marginal abatement costs will have 
an incentive to reduce emissions and sell their unused rights to countries 
with relatively higher marginal abatement costs.  The more emissions rights 
granted to countries, the more countries can benefit from a climate control 
treaty that allows them to sell those rights to other countries.  
Hence, the initial allocation of emissions rights becomes an important 
tool for redistributing the net benefits from global climate control.  This tool 
can be wielded in more or less equitable ways.  However, by exempting 
developing countries from mandatory emissions limits, the Kyoto Protocol 
granted developing countries unlimited property rights to the global 
atmospheric commons.  The exemptions created an undeniable windfall 
gain to developing countries, which could benefit from the emissions 
abatement of other countries without paying for any of the cost.  Had the 
rights awarded to developing countries been fully transferable, the benefits 
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to developing countries would have been greater even still.  However, the 
Kyoto Protocol limited trade in emissions rights, thereby lowering the value 
of those rights granted to developing countries.  
The Kyoto Protocol does allow for emissions trading between developed 
countries and does not specify an explicit limit on the use of emissions 
trading to satisfy countries’ commitments.69  In an implicit way, however, 
the use of emissions trading is limited by the requirement that domestic 
action constitutes a “significant element” of a country’s emissions reduction 
efforts.70  The clear intent of the Kyoto Protocol is that countries cannot 
meet their entire emissions target with permits purchased abroad.  
Emissions trading is extended to developing countries through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM).71  The CDM allows developed countries 
to receive “credits” towards their own emissions quotas for financing 
projects that reduce emissions in developing countries.72  CDM projects can 
also be unilateral, such that developing countries undertake CDM projects 
on their own without an explicit developed country partner and market the 
resulting emissions credits themselves.73  The essential requirement for 
CDM projects is that they reduce emissions below what would have 
occurred in the absence of that particular CDM project.74  For this reason, 
extending CDM credit to forest conservation and reforestation in 
developing countries is problematic.  It would require establishing reliable 
baselines for forest cover in developing countries with which to gauge the 
additionality of CDM forestry-based activities—a difficult task.75  
Accordingly, the application of CDM credits to forestry-based emissions 
reduction activity in the developing world is limited to only 1 percent of a 
country’s emissions target in any given year.  
The Kyoto Protocol limits the transferability of rights to the global 
commons by limiting the use of emissions trading and the CDM.  Concerns 
that emissions trading and the CDM could allow countries like the United 
States to escape the burden of costly emissions reduction and forestall the 
transition away from fossil fuels prompted the Kyoto Protocol’s current 
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limitation on emissions trading.  The efficiency loss associated with the 
exemption of developing countries from emissions quotas stems not from 
the transfer of property rights to developing countries for equity reasons, 
but because those property rights are not fully transferable.  As long as 
developing countries are awarded unlimited property rights, as they are 
currently by the Kyoto Protocol, developing countries could benefit more 
from unlimited emissions trading.  Allowing unlimited trading could 
increase the demand for low-cost abatement options in developed countries, 
thereby facilitating more investment in emissions abatement in the 
developing world.  It could provide incentives to developing countries to 
reduce emissions, as every ton of emissions produced would imply foregone 
earnings from the sale of emissions credits.  Accordingly, full emissions 
trading can improve the efficiency of the Kyoto Protocol and benefit 
developing countries, provided the initial allocation of property rights 
continues to favor developing countries.  This is ironic given that the usual 
arguments for extending emissions trading under the Kyoto Protocol cite 
the potential cost-savings for developed (not developing) countries and that 
objections to full emissions trading have been waged on these grounds.  
Moving forward beyond Kyoto, using full emissions trading to the 
benefit of developing countries will depend on two things.  First, it will 
depend on the initial allocation of rights to the atmospheric commons.  If 
exemptions are still granted to developing countries, they will have nothing 
to lose but something to gain from emissions trading.  Exemptions cast 
developing countries in the role of seller, not buyer.  Second, it will depend 
on the price paid by developed countries for the emissions rights developing 
countries sell.  The price, in turn, will depend on the extent of emissions 
reduction required by the developed world.  Consequently, a treaty that 
requires more extensive reductions in the developed world will not only be 
more successful in preventing climate change, but also will generate a larger 
windfall for developing countries.  
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The political obstacle, of course, is to convince developed countries to 
accept more extensive emissions reductions.  It is unlikely that developed 
countries, particularly the United States, will agree to more extensive 
reductions unless developing countries are required to limit their emissions 
growth.  In this case, the next stage in international climate negotiations will 
likely involve a very different initial allocation of property rights, and the 
net benefits to developing countries would be unclear.76  If this is the 
direction climate negotiations take over the next decade, explicit 
acknowledgement of the distributional consequences of the initial allocation 
of emissions rights is crucial if the global community is to retain its current 
commitment to fairness for developing countries.  
B.   Emissions Taxes  
If full emissions trading offers a more efficient approach to fairly 
distributing the net benefits from global climate control than exemptions for 
developing countries, global emissions taxes are better still.  A global 
emissions tax can achieve the same emissions abatement as emissions 
trading, while providing a more direct and transparent method of income 
redistribution.  Emissions taxes also avoid the predictable shortfalls of 
imperfect markets for emissions credits.  For example, large countries like 
the United States could drive up the demand for emissions credits, 
effectively pricing them beyond the ability of small countries to afford.  
This is problematic, particularly if developing countries are required to 
reduce emissions in the future and would have to compete against countries 
with significant market power to purchase those rights.  Historically, market 
mechanisms have worked more to the advantage of developed countries, 
and support for global emissions trading should be guarded for this reason 
alone.   
A global emissions tax adheres to the logic that the polluter pays, thereby 
providing the right incentives to all countries to reduce emissions.  To 
provide the right incentives to developing countries to reduce emissions, the 
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global emissions tax would have to apply to developed and developing 
countries.  If developing countries are exempt from a global emissions tax, 
the same inefficiencies that plague the Kyoto Protocol may still remain. 
Again, the exemptions would grant unlimited rights to the atmospheric 
commons, but unlike in the case of emissions trading, under an emissions 
tax scheme, developing countries would have no opportunities to benefit 
from the sale of those rights to other countries.  
From the perspective of developing countries, this approach is far less 
preferable.  To maintain the commitment to fairness under an emissions tax 
scheme, the revenues from those taxes would have to be recycled back to 
the developing world to offset the costs of their participation in global 
climate control.  Recycling can take the form of technology transfers or 
more direct payments.  Revenue recycling does not negate the incentive to 
abate emissions as long as the amount of revenue recycled back to any one 
country is independent of that country’s level of emissions reduction.77 
The potential to use global emissions taxes as an alternative to emissions 
trading, particularly if revenues are recycled back to developing countries, 
may seem politically untenable.  Many have rejected the possibility of 
global emissions taxes on this ground.  However, the redistributive transfers 
implicit in emissions trading schemes generally, and in the Kyoto Protocol 
more specifically, are no less potentially objectionable.  Not only did the 
Kyoto Protocol award a windfall gain to developing countries, but it also 
distributed the net benefits from climate control in arbitrary and far less 
obvious ways.  For example, by specifying emissions targets as a 
percentage of 1990 emissions levels, countries with higher emissions levels 
in 1990 benefit more than others.  Russia, because its emissions dropped 
significantly with the decline in its industrial activity post-1990, is now in a 
position to sell its emissions rights to other developed countries. 
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IV.   CONCLUSION 
The Kyoto Protocol is remarkable for its explicit commitment to fairness 
and the windfall gain it provides to developing countries.  This commitment 
to fairness, however, is currently jeopardized by the conventional economic 
treatment of  equity and efficiency as separable issues.  Pressure to remove 
the exemptions currently granted to developing countries is mounting under 
the guise that equity compromises efficiency.  If exemptions are removed, 
alternative mechanisms must be used to ensure fairness for developing 
countries.  If market-based mechanisms like emissions trading or taxes play 
a greater role in future climate negotiations, as proponents of greater 
efficiency in global climate control would like them to, it is imperative that 
these mechanisms are used deliberately to distribute the net benefits of 
climate control fairly and not just to increase efficiency.  Whatever 
direction the next round of global climate negotiations take, advocates for 
developing countries should remain clear on the relationship between equity 
and efficiency.  Beyond Kyoto, it is possible to improve efficiency in global 
climate control without sacrificing fairness, as long as the initial distribution 
of property rights continues to favor the developing countries. 
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